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Our understanding of what lies at the roots of remembering needs to evolve. 
Recent years have witnessed some daring new thinking about this topic 
in response to empirical findings from three main sources. Two of these 
sources paint a picture of remembering as transactional and extraindividual, 
on the one hand, and reconstructive and re-creative, on the other. The third 
set of findings challenge standard assumptions about the fundamentally 
representational character of remembering.
Going wide, a body of empirical work shows that—at least sometimes—
successful acts of remembering require heavy scaffolding by the  environment 
or by other individuals (Ren & Argote, 2011; Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 
2011). For example, there are well-documented cases in which interactions 
between romantic partners enable couples to remember things together 
that, as individuals, they cannot (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). Such 
findings have inspired the idea that remembering can be a widely distributed 
and interactive process that draws on extraindividual resources. In this 
vein, there has been an explosion of theoretical work that seeks to recast 
how we conceive of remembering in extended cognition terms (Sutton 
et al., 2010; Tollefsen, Dale, & Paxton, 2013; Kirchhoff, 2016; Huebner, 
2016; Heersmink, 2017a, 2017b). No doubt, these intellectual efforts are, 
as Skorburg (2017) observes, spurred on by the fact that transactional 
remembering is “low-hanging fruit for extended cognition theorists” 
(p. 473).
Looking inward, dramatic new proposals about memory ask us to 
reconceive what goes on in the heads of individuals when they remember. 
Novel scientific investigations concerning mental time travel have repeatedly 
confirmed the existence of strong similarities in the patterns of neural 
activity that enable us to recall past happenings and those that enable us 
to imagine possible futures. There is convincing empirical support that 
acts of memory and acts of imagining have a common basis (Szpunar, 
Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Schacter & Addis, 
2009; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). These findings encourage some theorists 
to propose that remembering and imagining are either identical or at least 
intimately related. Accordingly, remembering is deemed to be fundamentally 
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creative, imaginative, and dynamic in character (Michaelian, 2016; Clark, 
2016). Remembering thus conceived is not a matter of passive recollection, 
as some traditional cognitivist theories would have it.
Relatedly, a wealth of empirical findings has put pressure on the traditional 
assumption that the primary function of remembering is to accurately 
represent past happenings. Against the idea that acts of memory involve the 
straightforward recovery or replay of past experiences, it has been shown 
that we shift between field and observer perspectives during recall (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983). Against the idea that our memories are built for accuracy, 
what we remember is usually riddled with distortions. We regularly experience 
telescoping effects such that recent events are perceived as occurring in the more 
distant past than they did and vice versa, of more distantly occurring events 
being perceived as being more recent than they were (Neter & Waksberg, 1964; 
Thompson et al., 1996; Janssen et al., 2006). Also, we typically extend the 
boundary of scenes. For example, we remember more of the spatial boundary 
of a visual scene than was actually experienced (Intraub & Richardson, 
1989). Finally, it is well known that memories can be easily and significantly 
corrupted or wholly implanted by various means (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 
1978; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Roediger and McDermott, 1995; Garry et al. 
1996; Wade et al. 2002; Lindsay et al. 2004; Loftus, 2005).
All told, these combined scientific findings demonstrate that our natural 
memory capacities are fragile, easily open to outside influence and ill-suited 
to reliably reproduce undistorted, accurate representations. The amassed 
empirical evidence reveals that we get by when remembering in everyday 
contexts, doing well enough, without having to accurately represent past 
happenings. Indeed, stressing this, De Brigard (2014) concludes that, in the 
end, “it is a mistake to think of memory as [a] system that is uniquely— 
or even primarily—dedicated to reproducing the contents of previous 
experiences” (p. 177).
We propose an enactivist account of remembering that casts it as creative, 
dynamic, and wide-reaching. Such an account can more easily accommodate 
the aforementioned empirical findings than cognitivist accounts that 
conceive of remembering as always involving passive recollections that 
occur wholly and solely inside heads. According to our enactivist proposal, 
the roots of remembering can be understood in line with the Equal Partner 
Principle that holds that invoking neural, bodily, and environmental factors 
can all make equally important contributions when it comes to explaining 
and characterizing cognitive activity.
Augmenting this proposal, pivotally, it is argued that we achieve a 
stronger and more elegant account of the basis of remembering by going 
radically enactivist—viz., by abandoning the widely held assumption 
that remembering always and everywhere involves the retrieval of stored 
information or content in order to represent past events.
Seeking to understand the roots of remembering in a radical, content-free 
way is independently motivated by the fact that, should such an approach 
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to memory prove tenable, it would avoid seemingly intractable theoretical 
problems that arise when we try to account for information, content, and 
their causal powers within a naturalistic framework.
We currently lack workable naturalistic theories of information and 
content that would allow us to explain how information gets encoded, 
processed, and retrieved in order to generate remembered contents. As 
such we are motivated to explore and develop an alternative—extensively 
enactive—characterization of the roots of remembering that makes no such 
commitments.
The action of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 reviews a range of 
competing theoretical proposals about the nature of the contributions 
that individual and supraindividual resources make to everyday acts of 
remembering. We demonstrate that whatever stance is taken on the extended 
memory debate, the common denominator in all of the standard offerings 
is endorsement of the thesis that remembering necessarily involves having 
access to remembered content of some kind.
In Section 2, we propose an enactive account of the roots of remembering 
that surrenders this Remembered Content Assumption, or RCA. We propose 
an enactive alternative that can explain even semantically rich forms 
of memory retrieval in an empirically adequate manner, while avoiding 
the deep theoretical problems of accounting for the relevant notions of 
information and content naturalistically. We demonstrate these attractive 
features of our radically enactive account of remembering, showing how it 
is able to successfully handle classic cases from the extended mind literature.
Section 3 demonstrates that a radically enactive memory account also 
has the resources to explain individuals’ on-board, experientially rich forms 
of episodic memory. Even on the assumption that episodic memories take 
the form of or strongly depend on dynamic, re-creative acts of simulative 
imagining, we argue that such imaginings themselves are not best understood 
as inherently contentful nor are they best explained by the recovery of 
remembered content.
We conclude, in Section 4, that a radical enactive account of memory 
is able to understand the roots of remembering—even its dynamic and 
reconstructing character—in terms of on-board biological capacities that 
are sometimes supported by environmental and social resources, without 
assuming access to or retrieval of content plays any part in this process.
1  Remembered Contents and Questions of 
Extended Memory
There is an important assumption that goes unquestioned in much 
contemporary theorizing about memory: it is that acts of remembering 
primarily involve access to and recovery of content of some kind. Call this 
the Remembered Content Assumption, or RCA. The RCA is foundational in 
prominent debates about how to characterize the type of contribution that 
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external resources make in enabling everyday acts of recall. This is because 
the RCA supports a second important assumption: call it the Contentful 
Contribution Assumption, or CCA. According to the CCA, the contributions 
that external resources make to cognitive processes only count as cognitive 
contributions if they are informational or contentful contributions.1
Deciding whether external resources satisfy the criterion set out in the 
CCA has occupied the attention for those on both sides of the extended 
memory issue. For example, internalists who are skeptical of the very idea 
of extended memory wear their commitment to RCA and CCA on their 
theoretical sleeves. Pivotally, attempting to draw a familiar distinction, 
they insist that the use of external resources, even if crucial for completing 
certain memory tasks, can make only causal, and not properly cognitive, 
contributions to the process of remembering.
The standard way internalists attempt to draw the line between merely 
causal and properly cognitive contributions is to appeal to the further 
distinction between intrinsic and derived content. The former is thought 
to be a feature of certain kinds of mental states, where such mental states 
are taken to be the ultimate and original source of any and all content. The 
latter is borrowed from such mental states and assigned to artifacts such 
as “traffic lights, gas gauges and flags” (Aizawa & Adams, 2005, p. 662). 
Accordingly, any properly cognitive contributions are isolated to and 
“constituted by certain sorts of causal processes that involve nonderived 
content” (Adams & Aizawa, 2010, p. 68).
Consequently, any content that an external resource—say, a repository, 
such as a notebook—may be said to bear could, at best, be derived content. 
Taking this internalist ruling at its word raises the question of whether it 
makes sense to think of external resources as literally containing, or really 
being imbued with, any kind of content of their own. Certainly, external 
resources—so conceived—even if they are not simply dead signs, can 
make no contentful contribution to remembering that is independent of 
the memorizer. Hence such resources can add nothing cognitive into the 
memory mix, since the resources themselves are only assigned content by 
beings with contentful mental states.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) provide a philosophically famous thought 
experiment that compares the cognitive feats of Inga, who relies on her on-
board biological capacities in order to remember, and Otto, an Alzheimer’s 
sufferer who relies on an external notebook in order to do so. Internalists 
deny Otto’s notebook makes a cognitive contribution because it lacks 
content of the right kind. The chief spokespersons for this view, Adams and 
Aizawa (2001), hold that the crucial difference is that only biological brains 
have nonderived content whereas the symbols of Otto’s notebook have 
merely derived content. For this reason, they conclude that Otto’s accessing 
of the content of his notes is a noncognitive process and that the content of 
his notes do not “constitute beliefs or memories” (p. 55, emphasis added, 
see also Adams & Aizawa, 2010, p. 70).
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, edited by Kourken Michaelian, et al., Routledge, 2018.
The Roots of Remembering 101
External aids, on this view, help individuals to recover whatever contents 
their native biological memories are already assumed to have. Hence, use of 
external supports would at best instrumentally aid individuals’ capacities for 
recall of relevant events or facts, by helping them to construct the content of 
their memories rather than actually contributing any content to this process.
Going the opposite way on this issue, the exciting idea that launched 
a thousand papers on the extended mind hypothesis is precisely that, 
sometimes, memories can be found outside of people’s heads. Or more 
precisely, those attracted to the original, first wave version of the extended 
mind hypothesis assume that the information that constitutes beliefs  relevant 
to our memories is normally located somewhere within our biological brains. 
But such information need not be, and in fact is not always, internally 
located.
On this way of understanding what is essential for having a memory it is 
possible to imagine, for example, that the informational content of a memory 
might be located either in, say, one’s hippocampus or possibly in an artificial 
hard drive in one’s head.2 It is but a short step from this assumption to the 
idea that the content of one’s memory could also be externally located, say, 
in a hard drive outside of one’s head.
This is precisely what is being assumed when, in making their classic 
comparison, Clark and Chalmers (1998) tell us that Otto’s notebook and 
Inga’s hippocampus play the same roles in their respective rememberings. 
On their account, “the information in the notebook functions just like the 
information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens 
that this information lies beyond the skin” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, 
p. 13, see Rowlands, 1999, p. 122, 142). Thus for Inga, the content of her
“belief was sitting somewhere in memory waiting to be accessed” (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). The difference is that the informational basis of
Otto’s belief resides in his notebook, not in his wetware. Thus,  according
to the original version of the parity principle, advanced by Clark and
Chalmers, we ought to conclude that the information in Otto’s notebook
is part of his extended mind. This is because—on this way of telling the
story—the information in Otto’s notebook functions in the same way as
the information in Inga’s brain does in their respective acts of remembering.
Thus, in advancing their classic, first wave argument for the extended 
mind thesis, Clark and Chalmers (1998) present an objectified account 
of the contents of memory, according to which remembered contents are 
conceived of as accessible, objective commodities (see Loader, 2013, p. 167). 
Indeed, it is precisely because these first wave extended mind theorists have 
a commodity conception of the contents of biological memory that the idea 
of transposing the content of memories to external artifacts is such “an easy 
move for them” (Loader, 2013, p. 177).
The RCA and associated idea that memories have locatable contents is 
so familiar in the analytic tradition as to go unquestioned, even by those 
who deny the CCA. Thus new school internalists—those who defend the 
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, edited by Kourken Michaelian, et al., Routledge, 2018.
102 Daniel D. Hutto and Anco Peeters
idea that only that which is within occurrent consciousness properly counts 
as mental—do not bat an eye at the possibility that memory contents 
might be located outside the head (Gertler, 2007). Defenders of the idea 
that consciousness is what really matters for mentality do not take a stand 
on whether contents of memories are located internally or externally. For 
in their view, what really matters to mentality is only whether or not one 
actively and consciously entertains such contents, not the location of such 
contents. Thus, on this way of construing things, “Otto would . . . only 
have the content that MoMA is on 53rd Street ‘in mind’ when he reads his 
notebook and consciously entertains it” (Coleman, 2011, p. 105).
Setting out from the idea that conscious activity is all that matters to 
mindedness, Coleman (2011) offers a different parity principle—which 
states: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the head functions as a 
process which, were it to go on in the world, we would have no hesitation 
in rejecting as part of the cognitive/mental process, then that part of the 
head is (for that time) not part of the cognitive/mental process” (p. 105). 
According to Coleman’s (2011) revised parity principle, it follows that any 
contents that we might imagine to be stored in organisms will not be part of 
cognitive processes on the assumption that we do regard any contents stored 
in the environment as part of cognitive processes. This will be so, in either 
case, whether they prove accessible to consciousness or not.
All in all, what the analysis of all three of these options reveals is that 
there is a pervasive tendency to assume a “reified conception of memory” 
(Loader, 2013, p. 170). As such, to think of information and content in this 
way encourages us to think of memory as a kind of storehouse: it treats the 
notions of information and content interchangeably and regards both as 
commodities to which we can have access.
Importantly, although they hold on to the idea that information and 
 contents are stored, second wave extended mind theorists break faith with 
the idea that biological and external memory are alike in how they get their 
work done. Sutton (1998) warns against modeling the way brains store 
information on the way computers store information. The crucial difference 
is that nonbiological memory systems retain information statically such that 
it is “unchanged unless manipulated” (p. 4). In contrast, biological memory 
is fluid, reconstructive, and shifting (Sutton, 2010, p. 206).
Similarly, based on a wide-ranging review of the empirical literature, 
Michaelian (2012) argues that items stored in biological memory are 
unlike external records in that they are not discrete, stable items that are 
readily endorsed on retrieval. Forgetting is a feature, not a bug of biological 
memory. Hence, when it comes to understanding the dynamics of biological 
memory, Michaelian (2012) gives reasons for moving beyond the “simple, 
preservative picture,” adding that, “if memory is a container it is a rather 
leaky one” (p. 1156).
Bearing these considerations in mind, second wave extended mind  theorists 
recognize that even though internal and external resources—engrams and 
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exograms—have vastly different properties and profiles, they can still 
cooperate because they can serve the same overall cognitive ends in enabling 
acts of remembering. Shifting the emphasis away from parity arguments, in 
line with this observation, second wave theorists instead aim to clarify what 
individual and external resources, respectively, bring to the table in acts of 
remembering.
Second wave theorists seek to understand how memories are constituted 
and sustained by the integration of complementary contributions of internal 
and external resources involving “patterns of information-sharing and 
transmission” (Barnier & Sutton, 2008, p. 178). Importantly, once again, 
for those who are attracted to this sort of view, talk of processed information 
is treated as interchangeable with talk of content.3
In line with the CCA, there can still be a definitively cognitive con-
tribution to the overall process if, for example, the external resources 
make a contentful contribution, say, by filling in the ‘gaps’ in the con-
tents of already, partially recovered memories (Barnier & Sutton, 2008, 
p. 179). Focusing on the case of collective remembering, Barnier and Sut-
ton (2008) are interested in addressing the question: “how do groups
operate to process information” (p. 179). Here they emphasize the need
to look for complementary processes both within and across individuals,
precisely because they see no good scientific reason to adopt either of two
extremes: thinking of social factors as mere external triggers for internal
acts of remembering or thinking of acts of remembering as occurring
entirely extra-individually (p. 177). Thus, on their view, information is
exchanged between individuals when memories are transactionally scaf-
folded by others.
Crucially, for second wave extended mind theorists, memory picks 
out a diverse set of “cognitive capacities by which we retain information 
and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes” (Sutton, 
2012).4 Thus despite Sutton’s warning about not modelling the human 
mind on computers, it is fair to say that the ‘archival caricature’ still 
captures something important at the heart of the way certain contemporary 
philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists understand memory.
Despite acknowledging that the putative informational contents of our 
memories are stored in quite different ways in biological memory as opposed 
to external devices, second wave extended mind theorists remain committed 
to the RCA. Thus, they remain committed to a content-based view of 
remembering to the extent that they assume that there are contents to be 
stored at all—viz. to the extent that they retain the idea that remembering 
essentially involves receiving, encoding, and retrieving stored contentful 
information about particular events or episodes.
Those anticipating a third wave of extended mind go a step further. 
Whereas second wave extended mind theorists understand the parity 
principle of the first wave as being a special case of complementarity 
between inner and outer resources (Sutton, 2010, p. 206), it is suggested 
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that the third wave might altogether do away with “distinct inner and outer 
realms of engrams and exograms” (p. 213). Consequently, it is imagined 
that there could be a “deterritorialized cognitive science which deals with 
the propagation of deformed and reformatted representations, and which 
dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence 
among multiple structured media” (p. 213).
Although third wave extended mind theorists are prepared to imagine a 
more fluid and dynamic vision of cognitive science, as Sutton’s (2010) talk 
of creatively constructed representations reveals, it would seem that even 
such a dramatic shift in thinking would still retain the fundamental idea 
of RCA—namely, that memory depends upon manipulation of content of 
some kind.
2 Extensively Enactive Remembering
A more daring move, in thinking about what and how individual and supra-
individual resources contribute to acts of remembering, is to abandon the 
RCA—at least in thinking about basic memory processes—and to let go 
of the idea that such processes necessarily involve the production, sharing, 
and transmission of any contents whatsoever. The more radical forms of 
extensive enactivism propose just such a rethink of the nature of the most 
basic biological forms of individual memory and how they combine with 
external resources to enable many mundane acts of recall.
Radical enactivists about memory agree with internalists in holding that 
there is no informational content literally contained in Otto’s notebook that 
is accessed by him when he remembers. Yet, unlike most other theorists, they 
also deny that Inga’s biological brain is an interestingly different position. 
Radical enactivists pronounce a plague on both of these RCA houses: That 
is their version of parity.
Fundamentally, radical enactivists hold that the activity of remembering 
is not best understood in terms of the retrieval of remembered contents (see 
Loader, 2013; Hutto & Myin, 2017). Taking a radical line, enactivists of 
this stripe hold that memories come into being “on the spot” during acts 
of recall while abandoning the idea that “ongoing behaviour in such cases 
is explained by appeal to identifiable inner content bearers” (Clark, 1998, 
p. 100). Going the radically enactivist way is to conceive of  remembering
as a matter of ‘on-the-fly’ construction that can be grounded in  structural
synaptic changes in the brain as well as other structural changes in the
environment without assuming the existence of stored and retrieved
contents.
Scientific research on memory is rife with talk of “memory traces,” of 
“encoded and retrieved information,” and of “the storage and retrieval of 
information and representations.” Despite the popularity of this talk and 
associated metaphors, close inspection of how these notions operate in 
science reveals them to have serious limitations—limitations that make them 
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prime candidates for theoretical explication or elimination (see Roediger, 
1980). As De Brigard (2014) observes:
“Storing” is a rather misleading term. What seems to occur when we 
encode information is the strengthening of neural connections due to 
the co-activation of different regions of the brain, particularly in the 
sensory cortices, the medial temporal lobe, the superior parietal cortex, 
and the lateral prefrontal cortex. During encoding, each of these regions 
performs a different function depending on the moment in which the 
information gets processed. A memory trace is the dispositional property 
these regions have to re-activate, when triggered by the right cue, in 
roughly the same pattern of activation they underwent during encoding.
(p. 169)
Radical enactivists assume that De Brigard’s analysis is mostly correct, 
modulo any residual commitment in the previous claims that information 
or content is actually encoded and processed. Rather, radicals seek to 
explain basic forms of learning and memory entirely in terms of re-enacted 
know-how.
Focusing solely on the simpler kinds of procedural memory widespread 
in the animal kingdom, remembering can be understood as the capacity to 
re-enact embodied procedures—often prompted and supported by patterns 
of response that are triggered by external phenomena.
Memory of this sort entails knowing what to do in familiar circumstances. 
It is surely not necessary to posit stored mental contents in order to explain the 
dispositional basis of such capacities (Ramsey, 2007, Chapter 5). The brain’s 
underlying contribution to such capacities “turns out to be just a matter of 
either organizing extant synaptic circuits in new wiring patterns or switching 
on genes in neurons that produce new synapses. . . . The brain does everything 
without thinking about anything at all” (Rosenberg, 2014, pp. 26–27).
Importantly, purely embodied know-how is not grounded in or mediated 
by any kind of stored information or knowledge; rather it can be understood 
as the overall responsiveness of a complex system as shaped through habit 
and past experience (Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014).
This radically enactive account of basic memory can be provided, 
without gaps, so long as no appeal is made to the encoding and processing 
of information or representations. Radically enactive accounts of memory 
suspect that an information-processing story adds nothing of explanatory 
value to our understanding of how experience modulates neural connections 
and weights that support acts of remembering. If they are right, appeals to 
stored information, however popular, are superfluous.
Moreover, not only is it questionable whether talk of stored information 
and retrieved content adds any explanatory value, it is difficult to 
understand—ultimately—how such explanations would go even if it was 
thought that they are needed.
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Here it is important to acknowledge a deep theoretical problem—which 
Hutto and Myin (2013) dub the Hard Problem of Content, or HPC. The HPC 
highlights a problem in making easy appeal to the idea that brains  somehow 
literally process and store informational or other kinds of remembered 
 content. The HPC arises from the fact that the notion of information that 
can be most easily called on to do serious explanatory work in the sciences 
of the mind—a notion that might possibly fill in the scientifically respectable 
details of the information processing story—is the notion of information-
as-covariance. According to that notion of information, a state-of-affairs 
is said to carry information about another state-of-affairs if and only if it 
lawfully covaries with that other state-of-affairs, to some specified degree. 
The parade example is that of the age of a tree covarying with the number 
of its rings. Information in this sense is a perfectly objective and utterly 
 ubiquitous commodity—it literally litters the streets. Moreover, this notion 
of information has impeccable naturalistic credentials: it is used in many 
sciences. Thus, it can clearly serve the needs of a cognitive science with 
 explanatorily naturalistic ambitions.
Yet cognitivists face a dilemma if they try to tell the story of remembered 
contents using a naturalistically respectable notion of information. They 
might, on the one hand, opt for an information-as-covariance notion, 
or, on the other, they might try to call on some other naturalistic notion 
of information to understand memory in terms of content encoding and 
 information processing. Going either way has its problems.
In dealing with the first horn of the dilemma, they can try to give a 
naturalistically respectable explanation of information encoding and 
processing by appeal to the notion of information-as-covariance. Yet if that 
is the only notion of information in play in cognitivist theorizing about 
remembering, then it is difficult to understand what it could possibly mean 
for information to be literally encoded. How can relations that hold between 
covarying states of affairs be literally “extracted” and “picked up” from the 
environment so as to be “encoded” within minds?
Perhaps it will be objected that what should be focused on here is not the 
medium but the message. Sometimes the story about remembered contents 
is told in quasi-communicative terms of signaling and receiving messages. 
Yet how seriously should we take these analogies and the talk of encoding 
and decoding “messages” in the brain?
Once again there are grounds for caution. Despite the widespread 
popularity of talk of encoded signals and messages, attempts to seriously 
explicate the nature of neural or mental “codes” and their alleged 
encoded content are few and far between. Goldman (2012, p. 73) gives a 
frank appraisal of the current situation: “There is no generally accepted 
treatment of what it is to be . . . a mental code, and little if anything has 
been written about the criteria of sameness or difference for such codes. 
Nonetheless, it’s a very appealing idea, to which many cognitive scientists 
subscribe.”
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Even more worryingly, how should we understand the nature and source 
of any such putatively contentful messages? As information-as-covariance 
is not to be understood as the transmission of information from one system 
to another, this notion is surely not able to help us to understand how sense 
perception supplies the mind with contentful messages—messages that 
supply contents that can be encoded and decoded by biological brains. At 
any rate, as things currently stand, we lack a naturalistic theory of content 
to provide us with a substantive explanatory account of how to understand 
what contents are or how they might be stored and retrieved.
Can cognitivists deal more successfully with the second horn of the 
dilemma? They might try to call on some other naturalistically respectable 
notion of information that will enable them to tell content encoding and 
processing stories in full detail. Telling those tales in a different way requires 
identifying an alternative notion of information with sound naturalistic 
credentials that can do the relevant explanatory heavy lifting. Yet, at least 
as things currently stand, it is unclear if there is an alternative, scientifically 
respectable notion of information available has the right characteristics to 
do such explanatory work.
In light of this analysis, it becomes clear that the “storage” metaphor is 
not the only, or even the most, problematic card in the cognitivist deck, pace 
De Brigard (2014). The very idea that remembered contents might reside in 
biological brains invokes quite serious scientific mysteries. Such mysteries 
arise for anyone who takes seriously the idea that information is some kind 
of accessible, content-bearing commodity. These mysteries want dispelling, 
one way or another—they want explaining or explaining away.
Yet what is the alternative? One possibility is that “memory might not be 
a store at all, and that remembering might be active in a stronger sense than 
a reconstructive account of memory by itself allows—i.e., that it might be 
fruitfully understood as a type of action” (Loader, 2013, p. 173). A radically 
enactive take on memory “would focus not on access to the contents of a store 
but on remembering as a type of action” (Loader, 2013, p. 168). As Loader 
(2013) observes, an enactive account of memory is one that, following an 
attempted pattern of explanation used for understanding a range of other 
cognitive phenomena, eschews “representation in favour of action” (p. 175).5
The core idea of an enactivist account of memory, so construed, is cap-
tured in the slogans advanced by Stern (1991)—“memory is an ability to 
think and act in certain ways” (p. 203)—and Neisser (1996)—“ remembering 
is a kind of doing” (p. 203). Indeed, the elements of the enactive view can be 
found in a number of accounts of memory: those “which reject representa-
tionalism (e.g., Ryle, 1949; Malcolm, 1977; Wittgenstein, 1967; Stern, 1991; 
Neisser, 1996; Shanon, 1998) and those which emphasize the active nature 
of memory in ways which go beyond mere reconstructivism (Stern, 1991; 
Neisser, 1996; Toth & Hunt, 1999)” (Loader, 2013, p. 174).
Procedural memory—remembering how to execute certain types of 
action—lends itself to a radically enactive treatment. This is because 
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remembering of the procedural kind requires nothing more than reinitiating 
a familiar pattern of prompted response, albeit with adjustments that are 
dynamically sensitive to changes in circumstance and context (Sutton & 
Williamson, 2014).
Pivotally, for our purposes, purely embodied acts of remembering are 
marked by the fact that they do not require representing any specific past 
happening or happenings, and especially not representing these as past 
happenings. Remembering of this sort can be best characterized as enactive 
precisely because it is a matter of re-enactment that does not involve 
representation (Casey, 1987). Embodied or enactive forms of remembering, 
as exemplified by procedural memory, do “not store representations of 
external states of the world” (Schacter & Tulving, 1994, p. 26, see also 
Michaelian, 2016, p. 26ff.).
Yet even though we should not expect a contentless account of enactive 
memory to explain all features of every kind of remembering, if the 
approach is to be explanatorily interesting it would need to apply go beyond 
providing an account of procedural memory only. For, as Loader (2013) 
recognizes, there would be nothing “particularly surprising or useful in 
baptising procedural memory only as ‘enactive’ ” (p. 174).
There are sophisticated, situated forms of remembering involving 
semantic recall that can be adequately explained in terms of individuals 
directly interacting with environmental resources, without assuming the 
need for their accessing remembered contents.
Take Otto, for example. He is clearly capable of forming contentful beliefs 
about the world. The reminders penned in his notebook prompt him to 
judge—reliably and correctly—that the MoMA is on 53rd Street. This is so 
even though it is not plausible that he is retrieving that remembered content 
from either the notebook itself—as it only contains pen marks—or from his 
degraded biological memory. The point is that in Otto’s case an appropriate 
content is reliably formed—he forms an accurate semantic memory about 
a particular place. This is a declarative, not just a procedural memory, but 
arguably, the content of Otto’s memory is not accessed or recovered from 
any kind of memory store.
Or take another case that has impressed second wave extended mind theo-
rists. Tribble (2005) offers an insightful account of how Shakespearean actors 
in Elizabethan and Jacobean times used their theatre environment to  augment 
and support their biological memories. Their memory tasks could be for-
midable: some leading actors “had to secure and retain command of about 
 seventy-one different roles, of which number fifty-two or fifty-three were 
newly learned” (Beckerman, 1962, p. 9, as cited by Tribble, 2005, p. 136).
On Tribble’s (2005) analysis, the actors managed to remember their lines 
and parts by making special use of “immediate physical and social resources 
outside the person” (p. 140). Part of her explanation for their incredible 
memory feats is the fact that they relied on plots—folio-sized sheets of paper 
containing specific instructions on when and where to enter and exit, and 
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sound and music cues (p. 144). Yet even though these devices would have 
helped the actors grasp the large, skeletal action of the play—the ebb and 
flow of the scenes—they were “impossibly scanty. . . [containing] only the 
barest of cues, sometimes just a word or two” (p. 151). As such, the ac-
tors would have used well-rehearsed techniques of rote memory and the 
hooks provided by iambic pentameter, in conjunction with other cues and 
prompts, given by both the other actors and the structure of the playhouse 
to produce their performances.
In sum, they actively used their environment so as to ‘under-load’ their 
memories. The answer then, according to Tribble (2005, p. 151), lies in 
the actors exploiting opportunities for stripping away any “superfluous 
information” and off-loading “information” into the ambient environmental 
and social structures: the playhouse itself and other players.
Tribble and others attempt to explain these memory feats in terms of 
offloading information, but the details of this part of their explanation are 
brief and unclear. Which information, exactly, would have been off-loaded? 
How is this achieved? And once off-loaded, how does the informational 
content make a difference to the acts of remembering? A simpler and 
sufficient explanation is that the actors, through repeated practice in their 
particular environments, were able to use individual techniques, supported 
by resources in the environment, including one another, in order to reliably 
generate their performances. Once again, even though this complex activity 
does not reduce to mere procedural remembering, accessing remembered 
contents need play no part in explaining how the actors manage to generate 
their familiar pattern of lines.
Perhaps it will be conceded that access to, or the processing of, contents 
need play no part in explaining the acts of remembering that typify how 
Otto uses his notebook or how Shakespearean players used local cues to 
remember their lines while walking the boards. Still, it might be thought that 
even if radically enactive accounts can handle such cases of nonprocedural 
remembering, they cannot go further.
Hence, it might be conceded that radical enactivists can explain the kinds 
of remembering that are environmentally and socially scaffolded—those 
that are driven by direct engagement with external resources—without the 
need to posit stored and retrieved contents. Yet, even if this proves so, it 
might be thought that an enactive account of memory is still unable to tell 
the whole story of basic biological remembering. In particular, an enactive 
account may be deemed to lack the resources needed for explaining the sort 
of reconstructive imaginative acts that constitute experientially rich episodic 
forms of remembering. For many, it is difficult to imagine such a possibility.
3 Episodic Remembering as Enactive Imagining
A growing number of theorists have proposed that episodic remembering 
centrally involves or just simply is a form of re-creative or simulative 
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imagining—a kind of imagining that enables us to construct and entertain 
possible episodes that may have occurred (Gerrans & Kennett, 2010, De 
Brigard, 2014, Michaelian, 2016). The assumption here is that episodic 
memory, here, “refers, roughly, to the form of memory responsible for 
allowing us to revisit specific episodes or events from the personal past” 
(Michaelian, 2016, p. 5).
Crucially, the kind of recollective recall associated with episodic mem-
ory is taken to be essentially experiential in character; it has a distinctive 
 phenomenology (Debus, 2008, pp. 407–408).6 Many in the field assume 
that such episodic experiences are inherently representational. Bernecker 
(2010) exemplifies:
Experiential memory has two characteristics. First, one can experien-
tially remember only what one has personally experienced. Experiential 
memory is restricted to cases in which the claim to remember something 
incorporates the claim to have experienced it for oneself. Second, expe-
riential memory represents the remembered content from the first-per-
son perspective—from ‘within’—and involves qualitative experiences 
(qualia) and imagery. Experiential memory consists in the evocation of 
parts of the original experience in imagination, allowing one to relive or 
re-experience the original situation and going over what it was like . . . 
To experientially remember something one must not only remember 
what happened but also remember what it was like.
(pp. 13–14, final emphases added)
As the previous passage highlights, when we consider cases of episodic 
remembering in adult humans it can seem as if representational content 
is somehow built into re-lived experiences. This is because, inevitably, in 
reflecting on such cases we contentfully represent and make claims about 
those relived experiences. Arguably, in general, the phenomenal character 
and representational content can, and sometimes do, come apart (see Block, 
1990, Hutto, 2009). If we assume that this sort of separation can occur 
in episodic remembering then it follows that the phenomenal character of 
episodic remembering does not, by itself, entail or suffice for any represen-
tational content that may be connected with acts of episodic remembering. 
Indeed, being able to makes claims about one’s personal past—to have a 
truth-conditional take on it, as in cases of autobiographical memory that are 
distinguished from instances of pure forms episodic memory—is a special 
achievement, requiring the acquisition of additional cognitive machinery 
(Hutto, 2017). In particular, to make claims with truth conditional content 
requires the mastery of distinctive sociocultural practices (Hutto & Satne, 
2015; Hutto & Myin, 2017).
It might be thought that if episodic memory just is, or centrally involves, 
simulative imagining then it must be representational. This line of reasoning 
can seem compelling since imagining, by its very nature, deals with presence 
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in absence. If all imagining is necessarily representational then defeat for 
radically enactive accounts of imagination and memory follows briskly. 
However, on close inspection, there are strong reasons to doubt that basic 
forms of sensory imagination actually are, or even could be, representational 
(Medina, 2013; Hutto, 2015).
A major reason for doubting that simulative imaginings are representa-
tional at all is that unlike other familiar cognitive attitudes—such as beliefs 
and desires—they appear to lack any inherent correctness or congruence con-
ditions. For example, as Gerrans (2014) maintains, “qua simulations imagi-
native states do not have congruence conditions” (p. 105, see also p. 18). 
Or as Langland-Hassan (2015) tells us, “Much of what has been said about 
sensory imagination conflicts with the idea that imaginings have substantive 
correctness (or veridicality, or accuracy) conditions at all” (p. 665).
Turning the tables on the usual line of argument, if it turns out that 
imaginings lack any kind of correctness conditions essentially, then we 
have grounds for thinking that pure forms of episodic remembering are 
necessarily not content-involving. This is because—at least in the  analytic 
tradition—having some kind of correctness conditions is taken to be 
a  necessary condition for being in a state of mind with representational 
 content. We will not attempt to settle these important debates about the 
nature of sensory imaginings here. It suffices for our purposes to note that 
whatever their ultimate outcome, it is surely conceptually possible that 
imaginings, though they make a cognitive difference, not only lack the sort 
of content enjoyed by other canonical mental attitudes, but lack any kind of 
content whatsoever.
Still, even if this is accepted, it might be thought that episodic remember-
ing is content-involving in a different way and for a different reason. Com-
ing at the question from the bottom up, so to speak, it might be held that 
imaginative simulation—even if it is not inherently contentful in character 
in-and-of-itself—nevertheless depends on and is best explained in terms of 
so-called subpersonal processes that involve the acquisition, storage, and 
processing of informational contents.
For example, Michaelian (2016) holds that the best explanations of 
episodic remembering, understood as constructive and simulative, need to 
“assign an important role to information storage” (p. 8). By his lights, it is 
only by positing processes that access stored information that it is possible 
to explain how we imagine past episodes. Assuming tight links between 
remembering, imagining, and perceiving—in line with predictive processing 
accounts of these cognitive processes—it is assumed that what is cognized 
in such cases is a composite of content from multiple sources. Some content 
is taken to be supplied by low-level perceptual representations while other 
content is taken to be supplied by mental simulations, fueled in part by 
stored information.
Clark (2016) offers a similar account. Conceiving of perceiving, imagining, 
and remembering as a package deal, he offers us a similar prediction-based 
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account of episodic memory that freely employs talk of the mixing of high 
and low-level contents that stem from incoming information and stored 
representations (p. 102). Like Michaelian’s (2016) characterization, Clark’s 
account of episodic remembering is dripping in cognitivist assumptions and 
vocabulary.
Yet, despite the popularity of cognitivist characterizations of episodic 
rememberings, non-representational renderings are not only possible, they 
are arguably preferable. Why so?
Consider that with respect to procedural memory, there is nothing 
to declare and nothing that is declared. For this very reason, many are 
prepared to agree with radical enactivists that there is no explanatory gain 
in assuming that rules for the relevant procedures are somehow captured in 
information that is stored and encoded within cognitive systems (see Loader, 
2013; Sutton & Williamson, 2014; Michaelian, 2016).
Still, some balk at thinking of declarative forms of memory—episodic 
and semantic—in the same vein. It is thought that the latter phenomenon 
somehow depends upon recovering information or content. Thus when we 
recall particular episodes in our lives or recall semantic facts we somehow 
retrieve information stored in memory traces, making it available to the 
organism again (see Michaelian, 2016, p. 26). Allegedly, stored information 
does special causal, explanatory work in declarative forms of remembering—
work of a sort that there is simply no need for in nondeclarative forms 
of remembering. Illustrating this point by means of example, Michaelian 
(2016) tells us:
Declarative memories are available to consciousness and thus can 
affect the activities of other cognitive systems. I remember that it has 
been sunny every day for the past week; I infer that it will be sunny 
today; I therefore leave home without bringing an umbrella. An appeal 
to stored information is essential to the explanation of my behavior 
in this case, for the memory does not cause the behavior directly, but 
only via an intermediate process of reasoning. Conscious access to 
stored contents allows them to enter into the causation of behavior in 
various indirect ways, via reasoning, imagination, and other routes; if 
the subject were not to have such access, declarative memory would 
be unable to provide inputs to other cognitive processes. Thus, were 
we to suppose that declarative memory does not store information, we 
would be unable to explain certain modifications in the behavior of the 
organism.
(pp. 27–28, emphases added)
Here lie philosophical monsters. To tell this story in a fully naturalistic reg-
ister would require not only dealing with the hard problem of content, but 
also the hard problem of consciousness, as well as the problem of mental 
causation. And despite what Michaelian (2016) implies in his chapter when 
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giving his modally ‘musty’ assessment, a content-involving story about the 
roots of remembering is not, in fact, the only possible explanation available.
Rather than consciously accessing the stored content “It has been sunny 
every day for the past week,” I perhaps form the judgment with that con-
tent on the basis of executing a few episodic simulations. I might re-enact 
something I was doing on each of the various days to reach a conclusion 
about the weather for the week. If so, so long as the set of simulations that 
ground such declarative remembering are not themselves content-involving, 
even though a contentful memory is formed, it will not have been formed 
by consciously accessing any stored contents. Episodic re-creative simula-
tive imaginings could explain how we come to remember that it has been 
sunny every day for the past week without our having to posit any stored 
informational contents at all. And there seems to be no obvious reason why 
individual re-enactments themselves—even in full phenomenal glory—need 
involve the retrieval of any stored information.
This is the crux. Why should we assume that the brain must make 
information available to organisms in order to explain how simulation works 
in terms of re-creative re-enactment? There appears to be no more reason to 
assume that stored information and contents must play a part in simulatively 
re-enacting an experience than there is for thinking they need play a part in 
re-creating the repeated acts involved in procedural remembering.
Our recommendation is to think of episodic memory as strongly 
reconstructive (see Loader, 2013, p. 172). Radical enactivists see no reason 
at all to suppose that what lies at the roots of declarative memory differs 
from what lies at the roots of nondeclarative memory in this key respect. 
On the ground floor, neither form of memory gets its work done by making 
information or content stored in the brain available to the organism. If 
so, the capacities for experiential re-enactment—those that feature in 
pure episodic remembering and that are tied to be having certain kinds of 
phenomenal experience—need not make stored information available to the 
organism, as opposed to simply, partially re-creating patterns of activity in 
neural pathways in response to particular cues and prompts.
4 Conclusion
Taken together, the considerations in this chapter give us grounds for main-
taining that the roots of remembering need not involve and may not be 
best explained in terms of storing and retrieving any kind of remembered 
contents. If the analyses of this chapter prove sound, this will be true not 
only of procedural forms of remembering, but also of sophisticated kinds of 
remembering that benefit from environmental and social scaffolding, as well 
as reconstructive forms of experientially rich episodic remembering. The 
account we propose indeed understands the relevant kinds of remembering 
as the contentless activity of enactively constructing memories using biologi-
cal, environmental, and social resources.
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We do not expect that this will be the last word on these issues. In par-
ticular, extended mind theorists (especially those arriving on third wave) 
and those who favor reconstructive accounts of episodic remembering may 
be able to marshal responses to the challenges raised previously. It will be 
interesting to see, in the long run, to what extent a commitment to content-
ful representations and information-processing needs to be retained in our 
best explanations of what lies at the roots of remembering. To the extent 
that the next wave of extended mind theorists opt for more bidirectional, 
dynamic, and interactive visions of what remembering involves, a further 
question will be to determine to what extent we will need to retain a com-
mitment to a familiar functionalist framework for thinking about minds (see 
Hutto, Peeters, & Segundo-Ortin, 2017). Rethinking how we manage to 
think about the past may indeed help to radically shift how we think about 
thinking in the future.
Notes
1 Notably, a commitment to neither the RCA nor the CCA is necessary for extended 
mind theorists. They may choose, for example, to endorse a non-representational-
ist functionalism. Nevertheless, most extended mind theorists do, de facto, make 
both commitments. For a discussion of a related point see Wheeler (2017, p. 460).
2 Clark and Chalmers (1998) rarely mention content but instead talk of the beliefs 
that comprise the having of certain memories as being constituted by information. 
On the standard assumption that the beliefs relevant to having certain memories—
e.g., the belief that MoMA is on 53rd Street—are contentful it follows that, for
Clark and Chalmers, information is either interchangeable with or entails content
on their analysis of extended minds. Thus, as Coleman (2011) observes, in their
seminal paper Clark and Chalmers “compare the storage of endorsed content in a
notebook with the storage of endorsed content in the cranial biological memory”
(p. 101).
3 For example, Barnier and Sutton (2008) tell us that “Just as different forms of 
memory within the individual can operate on the same information as it is trans-
formed or abstracted or conventionalized (Toth and Hunt, 1999), so the same 
content can be transmitted across individuals, with its fate shaped by the available 
social resources and dynamics (Sperber, 1996)” (p. 179, emphasis added).
4 In later writings Sutton restricts the need to use information to reconstruct past 
experience to declarative forms of episodic memory (see, e.g., Sutton and William-
son, 2014).
5 Any enactive account of memory that eschews the idea that memory is fundamen-
tally in the business of accessing and manipulating representational or informa-
tional contents, would count as a radically enactive account of memory. Following 
Loader’s usage, we treat enactive of memory as co-extensive with radically enac-
tive accounts of memory.
6 As Debus (2007) illustrates “when you remember the last dinner party you went 
to, you might have an experience as if seeing again the person who sat opposite 
at the dinner. Or you might have an experience as if hearing once more some par-
ticular sounds or noises—the sudden bang emanating from the kitchen at some 
point, or a new tune played toward the end of the party. Indeed, in an attempt to 
describe those occurrences, we might say that ‘you see the person again in front of 
your mind’s eye,’ that you can ‘hear the tune in your head,’ and so on for the other 
senses” (p. 175).
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